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DECOUPLING OF STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION
FROM CERTIFICATION:
DOES QUALITY OF ISO 14001 IMPLEMENTATION
AFFECT FACILITIES’ ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE?

ABSTRACT
The literature on certifiable management standards has not paid sufficient attention to
implementation of standard requirements in certified firms. Firms that obtain standard certification
to achieve the legitimacy benefits of certification may not implement standard requirements
sufficiently to realize the standard’s intended performance outcomes. We argue that such decoupling
of implementation from certification threatens the effectiveness of certifiable standards as
governance mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct because standard certification may not
accurately signal firms’ superior environmental performance to external stakeholders. Empirical
findings based on the ISO 14001 standard at the facility level support this view: Quality of standard
implementation affects facilities’ environmental performance, and environmental performance of
certified and non-certified facilities does not differ significantly for the overall sample and lowquality implementers, while high-quality implementers have better environmental performance than
their non-certified counterparts. We provide recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of
governance systems for firm conduct based on certifiable standards.
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International certifiable management standards such as the ISO 14001 Environmental
Management System (EMS) are advocated as governance mechanisms for firms’ environmental
conduct in light of concerns about the ability of national governments to regulate firm conduct in a
globalizing world (Rappoport & Flaherty, 1992; United Nations, 1993). These standards specify
environmental management practices that are intended to reduce negative effects of firms’ operations
on the natural environment (Terlaak, 2007). Firms that implement the specified practices can obtain
standard certification by passing an audit by independent third-party auditors. Firms can use
standard certification to signal their environmental responsibility to external stakeholders such as
customers (King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005).
Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker,
1983) suggests that firms may be more interested in obtaining the legitimacy and signaling benefits
of standard certification than in fully implementing the practices prescribed by the standard in their
operations. Recent evidence confirms that despite third-party auditing some firms obtain standard
certification without continuously complying with standard requirements and incorporating the
prescribed practices in their daily activities (Boiral, 2003; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Yeung &
Mok, 2005) – a phenomenon known as decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such decoupling of
certification from implementation raises concerns about the effectiveness of certifiable management
standards as governance mechanisms because low quality of standard implementation may
compromise the environmental performance benefits intended by the standard.
Our study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of certifiable standards as governance
mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct by theoretically exploring how quality of standard
implementation affects certified firms’ environmental performance and whether standards are
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accurate signals of environmental responsibility. We empirically evaluate these issues in the context
of the most widely adopted certifiable environmental standard – ISO 14001.
Empirical studies of certifiable management standards have almost exclusively considered
the act of certification rather than the implementation of the standards’ requirements in certified
firms. Studies have addressed questions such as what determines standard certification (Bansal &
Bogner, 2002; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Darnall, 2001, 2003) and
whether environmental standard certification affects firms’ environmental performance (Andrews et
al., 2003; King et al., 2005; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b). By focusing only on certification these
studies have implicitly assumed that certification is synonymous to implementation. In this study,
we explicitly consider how variations in the quality of implementation of certifiable management
standards among certified firms affect their environmental performance. We define a certified firm’s
quality of standard implementation as the degree to which the firm adheres to standard requirements
and embeds the activities prescribed by the standard in its daily routines. Low quality implementers
decouple standard implementation from certification by failing to continuously comply with the
standard’s requirements and not using the prescribed activities in their daily operations, while high
quality implementers consistently comply with the standard and embed the prescribed activities into
their daily routines.
While the third-party monitoring associated with certification reduces the likelihood that
implementation is decoupled from certification, weaknesses in the auditing system such as lack of
auditor qualification and auditor conflict of interest provide opportunities for firms to obtain standard
certification without continuously adhering to the requirements of the standard (Boiral, 2003;
Christmann & Taylor, 2006; O'Rourke, 2003). We propose that decoupling standard implementation
from certification limits the effectiveness of certifiable standards as a governance mechanism.
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To provide a market based governance mechanism for firms’ environmental conduct in the
global economy (Boiral, 2003; Cashore, 2002; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Potoski & Prakash,
2004; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998) international certifiable standards need to fulfill dual functions.
First, certifiable standards need to be a tool for improving participating firms’ environmental
performance. They need to specify requirements that result in reductions of firms’ impact on the
natural environment and provide monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to assure that participating
firms follow these requirements. Second, certifiable standards need to accurately signal firms’
environmental responsibility to external stakeholders such as customers. Certification provides
information that is intended to allow customers to identify environmentally responsible suppliers at a
low cost. This enables customers to incorporate suppliers’ environmental responsibility as a criterion
in their purchasing decisions and provides market incentives for suppliers to obtain standard
certification to signal their environmental responsibility to customers who may prefer to do business
with certified firms. Thus, these standards are part of an emerging, mostly voluntary infrastructure,
that pressures companies for greater responsibility, accountability, and transparency (Waddock,
2008).
Empirical findings raise concerns about the effectiveness of certifiable standards as a
governance mechanism for firms’ environmental conduct. Studies have found conflicting evidence
on the relationship between firms’ certification to standards such as ISO 14001 and their
environmental performance and have not found that certified firms experience better environmental
performance than non-certified firms (Andrews et al., 2003; Darnall & Sides, 2008; King et al., 2005;
Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b). These findings suggest that
certifiable standards may not serve the two functions that they need to fulfill to be effective
governance mechanisms. The conflicting findings may be due to the fact that the literature has only
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considered the act of certification and ignored how certified firms’ quality of standard
implementation can influence their environmental performance.

If quality of ISO 14001

implementation affects environmental performance, a relationship between certification and
environmental performance may not exist.
We argue that variance in quality of standard implementation across firms can compromise
both of the functions that certifiable standards need to fulfill to serve as effective governance
mechanisms for firm self-regulation. First, we suggest that variance in the quality of standard
implementation results in variations in environmental performance in certified firms. Second, even if
certified firms’ environmental performance is affected by their quality of standard implementation,
standards may still serve their other function of signaling certified firms’ superior environmental
performance if certified firms have better environmental performance than non-certified firms. We
suggest that the inter-firm variation in standard implementation may be sufficiently large to
compromise the accuracy of standard certification as a signal of environmental responsibility.
Our results based on a sample of 72 ISO 14001 certified and 72 matched non-certified
facilities in the United States indicate that ISO 14001 implementation quality indeed affects certified
facilities’ environmental performance. We perform our empirical analysis at the facility level
because ISO 14001 certification is commonly granted to facilities rather than to entire firms. We
further find that while on average certified facilities do not differ significantly in their environmental
performance after certification from non-certified facilities, certified high-quality implementers have
better post-certification environmental performance than their non-certified counterparts. These
results highlight the importance of quality of standard implementation and cast doubts on the
effectiveness of governance systems based on certifiable management standards. We discuss the
implications of our findings for the design of enforcement mechanisms for certifiable standards, for
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firms that use certifiable standards to signal their environmental responsibility, and for future
research on certifiable standards.
THE ISO 14001 ENVIRONMENAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The ISO 14001 environmental management system standard was launched in 1996 by the
International Organization for Standardization, the world’s largest standard setting organization
with a membership of national standards institutes from 157 countries. ISO 14001 requirements
specify the elements of a generic environmental management system that can be used by firms of
any size, in any industry, in any country to manage their environmental impacts. ISO 14001
certification is awarded by independent third-party auditors (also referred to as registrars) that
need to be accredited by national ISO member bodies such as ANSI-ASQ in the United States.
The generic character of the standard and the possibility to obtain certification in countries
around the world have resulted in high adoption rates (Mendel, 2002). With 188,815 certified
facilities in 155 countries as of December 2008 (ISO, 2008), ISO 14001 is the most widely
adopted environmental management standard in the world.
Some firms adopt an environmental management system and choose not to obtain external
certification to a particular standard. Some of them follow the ISO 14001 requirements and selfdeclare that their EMS meets ISO 14001 standard (Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000). Such an in-house
EMS lacks the external verification process to determine if the firm is properly implementing the
system and such firms will not gain the signaling and legitimacy benefits associated with external
certification to a standard such as ISO 14001 (Bansal & Hunter, 2003). Therefore, many firms with
an EMS take the extra step of certifying to ISO 14001.
Like other international certifiable standards that seek to provide market-based governance
mechanisms to regulate firm conduct in the global economy, the ISO 14001 standard is designed to
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be a tool for improving firms’ environmental performance and to be a signal of firms’ environmental
responsibility to external stakeholders. In this section we will discuss these two functions of ISO
14001 and their implications for the environmental performance of certified firms.
ISO 14001 as a tool for improving environmental performance
“The general purpose of [the ISO 14001] standard is to provide assistance to
organizations that wish to implement or improve an environmental management system and
thereby improve their environmental performance” (ISO, 2004). The requirements established by
ISO 14001 are based on rational and systematic management principles that the entire organization
needs to subscribe to (Boiral, 2007). The major steps that firms have to follow to obtain ISO 14001
certification include the following (Bansal & Bogner, 2002). First, firms have to review their
activities and identify all their environmental impacts as well as applicable environmental
regulations. Second, they have to develop a plan to conform to environmental regulations, develop
an environmental policy to which senior management is committed, and set specific environmental
goals and targets to reduce their environmental impact. Third, firms have to implement their
environmental policy and work towards achieving their targets and goals by communicating the
EMS to their employees, training and empowering them, and documenting relevant procedures.
Fourth, firms have to perform periodic internal audits to identify their actual environmental impacts
and address any nonconformance with their goals. Fifth, firms have to periodically assess their EMS
through a management review process and make necessary changes. This regular review of their
systems, structures, policies, and goals enables continual improvement.
Firms’ adherence to the formal requirements of ISO 14001 is expected to lead to changes in
their management of environmental issues that can result in improvements in their environmental
performance. The establishment of environmental policies and senior management commitment
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makes protecting the environment an organizational priority.

Requirements such as regularly

tracking organizations’ environmental performance and progress towards the achievement of its
environmental goals establish internal feedback mechanisms that contribute to environmental
performance improvements. Practices such as the identification of environmental aspects in work
practices, development of training programs for employees and management, and documentation of
environmental practices help to integrate environmental concerns into daily practice, raise
management and employee awareness and involvement, and add more rigor to environmental
programs (Jiang & Bansal, 2003). Implementing the ISO 14001 EMS often fosters the adoption of
additional environmental practices, such as substitution of polluting and hazardous materials,
recycling systems, responsible disposal of waste and residues, and acquisition of clean technology
(Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2008; Sroufe, 2003). ISO 14001 implementation can also
contribute to better compliance with environmental regulations as the ISO 14001 EMS requires a
systematic documentation and follow-up with applicable environmental regulations (Potoski &
Prakash, 2005b).
Studies have shown that external monitoring is essential for effective firm self-regulation
through voluntary standards because in the absence of monitoring or sanctions poor environmental
performers have incentives to free-ride by adopting the standard but not changing their behavior
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King & Lenox, 2000). ISO 14001’s third-party audit system provides
a monitoring mechanism that is intended to ensure that certified firms comply with the ISO 14001
requirements. The third-party audit is intended to assess the extent to which firms comply with ISO
requirements and to help spot opportunities for improvement (Jiang & Bansal, 2003).
Both ISO 14001’s requirements and its third-party audit system are intended to ensure that
certified firms are reducing the negative impact of their activities on the natural environment.
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Several empirical studies have indeed shown a positive relationship between ISO 14001 certification
and firms’ environmental performance (Melnyk et al., 2003; Potoski & Prakash, 2005a; Russo, 2001)
or regulatory compliance (Kwon, Seo, & Seo, 2002; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b). For example, ISO
14001 certification was found to reduce wastes in production processes (Melnyk et al., 2003) and
toxic emissions (Russo, 2001). Potoski & Prakash (2005a) showed that certified facilities reduced
pollution emissions more than non-certified facilities. Furthermore, ISO 14001 certification was
found to reduce the time facilities spend out of compliance with environmental regulations in the
U.S. by about 7 percent (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b) and ISO 14001 certified facilities in Korea
have less environmental violations than non-certified facilities. (Kwon et al., 2002).
ISO 14001 as a signal to external stakeholders
Institutional theory suggests that in order to survive, organizations must conform to
institutional pressures from their external environment such as those from regulatory agencies,
industry associations, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders even if conforming to
such pressures may have little to do with technical efficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987;
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1987). Such conformance to institutional pressures provides
enhanced legitimacy to these organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1987). Firms that adopt organizational
practices for legitimacy reasons rather than for efficiency reasons often decouple implementation
from adoption by not incorporating these practices in their daily activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Decoupling enables organizations to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders while
minimizing the uncertainties of incorporating the new practices on the existing technical activities of
organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Firms have incentives and opportunity to decouple ISO 14001 implementation from
certification. Decoupling allows firms to gain the legitimacy and signaling benefits of ISO 14001
certification without incurring the higher costs and potential organizational disruptions of high
quality implementation. Because firms obtain certification to standards such as ISO 14001 primarily
to satisfy external institutional pressures from customers that require or prefer their suppliers to be
certified (Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Jiang & Bansal, 2003) many
suppliers are more interested in obtaining certification to signal their environmental responsibility
than in implementing the ISO 14001 EMS to achieve the intended environmental performance
benefits.
High quality implementation of ISO 14001 results in higher costs and greater organizational
disruptions than low quality implementation. High quality implementation requires considerable
commitments of time and resources such as ongoing maintenance of the EMS and updating of its
documentation, continuous training of employees and managers, and regular reviews and internal
audits of environmental issues, all of which are costly (Delmas, 2002; Yeung & Mok, 2005).
Indeed, many firms realize that more resources in terms of time, cost, and skills are required to
develop and maintain the EMS than was initially expected (Balzarova & Castka, 2008).
Furthermore, many managers believe that ISO certification adds more bureaucracy and constraints to
their firms’ activities (Boiral, 2003; Boiral & Sala, 1998). For example, some managers perceive that
many administrative tasks required by the ISO system such as documentation contribute to decreased
productivity and operating smoothness (Boiral, 2003). Such perceptions lead to internal resistance to
ISO implementation and thus will likely contribute to low quality implementation. Thus, firms have
incentives to symbolically implement the standard and pursue only the minimum quality of ISO
14001 implementation necessary to pass the certification audit.
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While the independent audits associated with ISO 14001 certification reduce the
likelihood of decoupling certification from implementation, several weaknesses in the ISO 14001
auditing system combined with the standard’s lack of specific performance requirements provide
opportunity for firms that do not comply with ISO 14001 requirements to obtain certification.
First, some auditors lack the business and technical knowledge of specific industries (O'Rourke,
2002; Seddon, 1997; Swift, Humphrey, & Gor, 2000; Van Der Wiele & Brown, 1997; Yeung &
Mok, 2005) that is required to discover non-conformances during the on-site audit. This problem
of auditor qualification is exacerbated by the fact that ISO 14001 prescribes design elements of
an EMS that leave “significant room for … interpretation” (Nawrocka & Parker, 2009: 603)
rather than setting specific performance targets. Such process requirements complicate verification
of compliance and increase the importance of auditor expertise as the criteria on which auditors
base awarding certification cannot be objectively measured.

The fact that firms seeking

certification play a vital role in the auditing process by providing documentation to external
auditors increases concerns, because some firms take actions to provide the appearance to
auditors that they use ISO standards in their daily operations when they actually do not (Boiral,
2003; 2007). Less qualified auditors may uncritically accept the internal report prepared by
firms (Yeung & Mok, 2005). The resulting differences in audit rigor allow firms to pass an audit
carried out by one auditor while they would fail if a different auditor performed the audit (Boiral,
2003; Yeung & Mok, 2005).

Thus, even if an audit concludes that a firm has properly

implemented the EMS the substantive performance of the audited firm (in terms of how they
implement the standard’s requirements) may be poor (Power, 1997: 60).
Second, auditor independence is essential to assure unbiased certification, but ISO 14001
auditors are selected and paid by the firms seeking certification. Firms may be inclined to select
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or continue business relationships with auditors who will provide the desired certification
(Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006; Swift, et al., 2000). This creates a potential conflict
of interest for auditors, who may not fail undeserving companies because this would lead to a
loss of clients (Moore et al., 2006; Seddon, 1997).
Third, the ongoing nature of complying with ISO 14001 diverges from the periodic
nature of certification and recertification.

Compliance with management system standards

requires ongoing active utilization of the management system. ISO 14001 certification and
recertification audits are scheduled periodically at pre-announced dates. These audits occur only
every three years with less extensive pre-announced bi-annual or annual surveillance audits.
Critics contend that auditing involves visits to factories that are too infrequent to evaluate normal
day-to-day operations and the duration of the audit itself is too short to identify more than the
most obvious problems, missing many important issues (Boiral, 2003; O'Rourke, 2002, 2003).
These problems in the ISO auditing system raise a more fundamental question about
ISO’s commitment to setting meaningful standards and assuring rigorous auditing of certified
firms. 1 Critics of the ISO system contend that the stakeholders involved in the development
process of ISO 14001 represent primarily the interests of industry, while key stakeholders
representing the groups heavily impacted by the standard are excluded from the process
(Balzarova & Castka, 2008; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007).

As the outcomes of the standard

development process reflect the interests of the participating stakeholders it has been argued that
the ISO 14001 standard reflects the interests of industry in an undemanding standard (Ecologia,
2002) that may not be accompanied by rigorous auditing mechanisms. Such an undemanding
standard with lax auditing would allow firms to easily gain certification to signal their
commitment to environmental responsibility to external stakeholders.
1

We would like to thank the editors and one of the reviewers for bringing this line of argument to our attention.
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Studies have shown evidence of decoupling implementation from certification for the ISO
14001 standard and for the similarly designed ISO 9001 quality management system standard.
Boiral (2003) showed how ISO 9001 adoption resulted in ritual behavior for the purpose of
demonstrating superficial conformity to the requirements of the standard particularly around the time
of the certification audit. Boiral (2007) found that ISO 14001 is mostly ceremonially adopted by
firms, that is, certification to ISO 14001 is only loosely associated with firms’ actual practices.
Others found variance in the implementation of ISO standards in facilities in the United States and
China (Aravind & Christmann, 2007, 2008; Christmann & Taylor, 2006).
Decoupling ISO 14001 implementation from certification will likely jeopardize the
environmental performance benefits intended by the standard. Certified firms that only symbolically
implement ISO 14001 without using the prescribed practices in their daily operations may not make
the changes in managing their environmental issues that are required to improve environmental
performance. Hence certification may not be an accurate signal of environmental responsibility for
all certified firms. Indeed, many empirical studies have found that ISO 14001 certification does not
lead to superior environmental performance. Studies have found that adoption of environmental
management systems improves environmental performance, but that ISO 14001 certification does
not add value beyond establishing an EMS (Andrews et al., 2003; King et al., 2005). A study
found that ISO 14001 certified pulp and paper plants did not perform better than non-certified
facilities (Barla, 2007). A recent meta-analysis (Darnell and Sides, 2008) showed that empirical
evidence on the environmental performance benefits of ISO 14001 certification is inconclusive. This
lack of a positive relationship between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance is
consistent with low-quality implementation of the ISO requirements in a large number of firms.
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Examining how firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation rather than their certification affects
their environmental performance can shed more light on the causes for these insignificant findings.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Our hypotheses address how the quality of ISO 14001 implementation in certified firms
affects the two functions that certifiable standards need to fulfill to be effective governance
mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct in the global economy – improving firms’
environmental performance and providing an accurate signal of firms’ environmental
responsibility to external stakeholders. Our first hypothesis proposes a link between quality of
ISO 14001 implementation and environmental performance in certified firms. Our subsequent
hypotheses test the accuracy of ISO 14001 as a signal of superior environmental performance by
comparing the environmental performance of ISO 14001 certified and non-certified firms.
The importance of standard implementation
Not much is known about the relationship between quality of ISO 14001 implementation
and firms’ environmental performance. Barla’s (2007) finding that environmental performance
differs widely among ISO 14001 certified pulp and paper plants is consistent with the argument that
certified firms vary in their quality of standard implementation and that quality of
implementation affects their environmental performance.

Only few empirical studies have

explicitly considered variations in standard implementation among certified firms. These studies
have looked at the determinants of implementation quality (Christmann & Taylor, 2006) and the
relationship between implementation quality and managers’ perceptions of benefits from
standard adoption (Yin & Schmeidler, 2009). Yin & Schmeidler (2009) find that managers in
certified facilities with low quality of ISO 14001 implementation believe that ISO 14001 does
not result in environmental performance benefits. While this finding is consistent with the
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argument that quality of implementation affects environmental performance it may also be due to
a general negative perception of ISO 14001 by these managers. A positive relationship between
quality of practice implementation and realization of the practice’s intended performance
benefits has been found in the context of another management practice – Total Quality
Management (TQM) (Ahire, Waller, & Golhar, 1996; Claver & Tari, 2003; Douglas & Judge,
2001; Rao, Raghunathan, & Solis, 1999).
ISO 14001’s requirements are intended to change firms’ management of environmental
issues in ways that improve environmental performance. Rondinelli & Vastag (2000) concluded
that following the spirit of the ISO 14001 guidelines results in attitudinal, managerial and
operational changes that provide environmental performance benefits through waste reduction
and pollution prevention.

However, these improvements in environmental performance are

contingent on the proper implementation and continuous use of the ISO 14001 practices. A firm that
implements ISO 14001 symbolically with minimal changes its daily operations is not likely to
experience the performance benefits intended by ISO 14001. Thus, we can expect that a firm’s
quality of ISO 14001 implementation is positively related to its environmental performance.
Hypothesis 1: The higher a firm’s quality of implementation of the ISO 14001
requirements the better the firm’s post-certification environmental performance.
Signaling accuracy of ISO 14001
ISO 14001 can only be an effective governance mechanism for firm self-regulation, if
ISO 14001 certification is an accurate signal of firms’ environmental responsibility, i.e. if ISO
14001 certified firms are better environmental performers than non-certified firms.

Even if

Hypothesis 1 is supported and implementation quality affects environmental performance certified
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firms may still have better environmental performance than non-certified firms. Our next set of
hypotheses addresses this issue.
The two functions of ISO 14001 provide conflicting predictions about the signaling accuracy
of ISO 14001. On the one hand, adopting ISO 14001 requires firms to implement an environmental
management system that should improve their environmental performance. Thus, ISO 14001
certified firms may have better environmental performance than non-certified firms that may not
have such EMSs in place. On the other hand, institutional theory suggests that ISO certified firms
are primarily interested in the legitimacy and signaling benefits of ISO certification rather than its
potential environmental performance benefits. These firms will likely implement the standard
symbolically and fail to integrate the ISO EMS in their daily operations, but do the minimum required
to pass the certification audit. The failure to use the ISO EMS in daily operations suggests that
differences in environmental performance between certified and non-certified firms may not exist.
The signaling accuracy of ISO 14001 certification may additionally be compromised
because some firms implement an EMS to manage their environmental impact without obtaining
certification to the ISO 14001 standard (King et al., 2005). Thus, some non-certified firms
realize the environmental performance benefits of an EMS, which also reduces the
environmental performance gap between certified and non-certified firms.
This discussion leads to two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: ISO 14001 certified firms have larger environmental performance
improvements after certification than non-certified firms.
Hypothesis 2b: ISO 14001 certified and non-certified firms do not differ in their
environmental performance improvements after certification.
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The accuracy of ISO 14001 certification as a signal of environmental responsibility may
hinge on firms’ quality of implementation. Certified firms that pursue high quality implementation
and use the ISO EMS in their daily operations may derive environmental performance benefits
from EMS implementation and thus, may exhibit superior environmental performance compared
to their non-certified counterparts. Certified firms that pursue low quality implementation may
not gain the environmental performance benefits intended by the ISO 14001 EMS. Therefore,
these firms’ environmental performance may not differ from their non-certified counterparts.
Hypothesis 3a: ISO 14001 certified firms with a high quality of implementation
have larger environmental performance improvements after certification than
non-certified firms.
Hypothesis 3b: ISO 14001 certified firms with a low quality of implementation do not
show a difference in environmental performance improvements after certification
relative to non-certified firms.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
We tested our hypothesis using data from ISO 14001 certified facilities in the United States.
We conducted our analysis at the facility level as ISO 14001 certification is mostly granted at the
level of individual facilities such as plants. Our sample is cross-sectional which provides variance in
the motivations for certification, which we expect to result in differences in the quality of
implementation across certified facilities.

For example, firms in the automotive industry face

coercive pressures from their supply chain partners to obtain certification (King et al., 2005), which
may make low quality implementation more likely, whereas in other industries such pressures may
not exist possibly resulting in higher quality implementation. The United States provides an ideal
research setting for our study as facility level data on environmental emissions is available.
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We obtained data from multiple sources. Some of our measures are based on a mail
questionnaire survey, since data on the implementation of ISO 14001 in facilities cannot be obtained
from public sources.

We also used secondary data from sources such as the United States

Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database, the United States
Census Bureau, and the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) Million Dollar Database to either construct
measures or triangulate survey-based measures.
Sample and Data Collection
This study is part of a larger research project on ISO 14001 implementation for which we
collected data from ISO 14001 certified facilities in the United States. We identified ISO 14001
certified facilities from the Spring 2006 edition of QSU Publishing Company’s ISO 14001
Worldwide Certified Company Directory (QSU, 2006), the most comprehensive database of certified
facilities in the United States. This directory contained information such as facility name, address,
SIC code, date of certification, and name of the individual responsible for ISO 14001 for 5284
facilities. We restricted the mailing sample for our research project to 600 randomly selected
facilities from the QSU directory to ensure that we were able to perform adequate follow-up to
achieve a good response rate for our questionnaire survey. For this study on the relationship between
ISO 14001 implementation and environmental performance we were only able to consider those 266
of the 600 facilities that obtained initial certification between 1998 and 2002, because for facilities
that were certified outside of this timeframe we were not able to obtain environmental performance
data for three years before and three years after their initial certification from the TRI database. 2

2

We had usable TRI data for the years 1995 to 2005. 2005 was the last year for which TRI data was available at the
time of analysis. We chose 1995 as our earliest year because in this year a large number of chemicals were added to
the list of chemicals for which facilities must report their releases to the TRI. Therefore, the information on TRI
releases for years prior to 1995 is not comparable with TRI release information from 1995 onward.

Copyright © Society for Business Ethics. This is a non-copyedited version19
of a paper forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly.
It is available for personal scholarly use only. Any other use is subject to the same permissions terms as articles published in BEQ.

The target respondent for our survey was the individual at the facility who is responsible for
ISO 14001. We initially identified this individual from the QSU database (where it was available)
and made phone calls to each facility in our mailing sample to confirm the identity of this individual
and to obtain the name of the person for those facilities where the listed individual was no longer
in charge or that did not have a name listed in the database. Our respondents were mostly facilitylevel Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) Managers or Quality Managers. The average
management experience of our respondents is 14.9 years. Like other studies on ISO standards (e.g.,
Boiral & Roy, 2007; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2008; Melnyk et al., 2003) we used a
single-informant approach. Such an approach is likely to result in reliable and valid data if the
informant is carefully chosen (Campbell, 1955; John & Reve, 1982). Our chosen target respondent –
the person in charge of ISO 14001 – is likely to be the most knowledgeable individual at each facility
and thus is the most appropriate person to complete our questionnaire.
We developed our questionnaire based on existing literature on certifiable management
standards, implementation of such standards, and environmental performance (e.g., Christmann &
Taylor, 2006; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Naveh & Marcus, 2005; Naveh
& Marcus, 2004) and incorporated feedback from managers obtained in interviews and pre-tests. We
discussed the initial version of our questionnaire during personal interviews with four facility
environmental and/or quality managers in the U.S. who were responsible for the ISO 14001 system
at their facility. These managers also provided us with extensive written feedback on the survey
questions. After making changes based on their suggestions we conducted a pilot study with a
shortened version of the questionnaire containing our key measures with managers who attended a
regional meeting of the American Society for Quality in September 2006. Based on their feedback
and results from this pilot study, we designed the final version of the survey.
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We based our survey administration on the tailored design method which has been shown to
improve response rates to mail surveys (Dillman, 2000). We conducted the first mailing of our
survey in October 2006, and performed two follow-up mailings in December 2006 and January
2007. Of the 600 mailed surveys 13 were undeliverable due to incorrect addresses, and of the
remaining 587 surveys 199 were returned completed yielding a response rate of about 34 percent.
For those 266 facilities that were certified between 1998 and 2002 we achieved a slightly higher
response rate of about 38 percent (101 completed surveys were returned).

These response rates

compare favorably with other studies on ISO standards that achieved response rates of 10.35 percent
(Melnyk et al., 2003) and 31.4 percent (Boiral and Roy, 2007). Of the 101 facilities certified
between 1998 and 2002 that returned surveys, 72 had three years of pre-and post-certification TRI
data available and could be included in our empirical analysis. The mean size of our respondent
facilities was 545 employees with the number of employees ranging from 25 to 2700.
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 which require comparing the environmental performance of ISO
14001 certified and non-certified facilities, we constructed a sample of 72 non-certified facilities that
were matched as closely as possible to the 72 certified facilities in our sample in terms of industry
membership, location, and facility size. For each of the 72 certified facilities we used the NAICS
(North American Industry Classification System) Code and location information in the TRI database
to identify potential matched facilities that were in the same industry and located as close as possible.
We matched facilities by location based on the state in which facilities were located and further set a
criterion that each matched facility should not be more than 150 miles from the corresponding
certified facility. Then we used the QSU database to eliminate those potential matches that were ISO
14001 certified. We further compared the size of each certified facility in our sample (measured as
the number of employees) to the closest non-certified facility in the same industry. We obtained size
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information for the non-certified facilities from secondary databases including Hoover’s and Manta.
If a large size discrepancy between a certified facility and its closest matched non-certified facility
existed, we compared the size of the next closest non-certified facility until we found a facility of
similar size. Using industry membership as a matching criterion allows us to control for factors that
affect the environmental performance of all facilities in an industry such as technological advances,
changes in federal government regulations, or other stakeholder pressures. Using location as a
matching criterion controls for factors that affect the environmental performance of all facilities
located in the same region such as regional (state level) environmental regulations. Using facility
size as a matching criterion allows us to control for any differences in environmental performance as
a result of possible economies of scale in the management of environmental issues.
Assuring data quality
We took several steps to assure the quality of our survey data and to minimize common
methodological problems of using survey data such as common method variance (Campbell & Fiske,
1959; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). First, we adopted measures to reduce social
desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which should increase truthfulness of responses. We
guaranteed anonymity to respondents and reduced evaluation apprehension by assuring respondents
that there are no right or wrong answers. We also aimed to develop survey items that are factual
rather than perceptual and that are based on objective behavior rather than on subjective attitudes.
For example we asked respondents whether they use ISO documents in daily practice rather than
asking them how useful they perceive these documents to be. Second, to avoid respondents
misunderstanding the survey questions we avoided vague concepts, kept questions simple and
precise, and decomposed questions with more than one possible interpretation to simpler, more
focused questions. Third, we avoided problems of common method bias (Campbell & Fiske, 1959;
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Podsakoff et al., 2003), that are frequent in survey research that relies on collecting independent and
dependent variables from the same respondent at the same time, by using survey data only for our
independent variables and using the TRI database to construct our dependent variables. In addition,
we used secondary sources to obtain or triangulate some of our control variables.
Representativeness of Respondents
We performed three tests to ensure that our ISO 14001 certified respondents were
representative of our mailing sample. First, a comparison of respondents to non-respondents showed
that these two groups of facilities do not significantly differ in terms of facility size (number of
employees) and that our respondents are representative of our mailing sample in terms of industry
membership and location. We found no differences in response rates across two-digit SIC industries
and states in which facilities are located. Second, a wave analysis showed that a self-selection bias,
which makes facilities with certain characteristics more likely to respond to our survey, is unlikely to
exist. Wave analysis assumes that non-respondents are more similar to late respondents than to early
respondents (Fowler, 1993). A comparison of responses to our first mailing and to our third mailing
revealed no significant differences in the levels of the variables included in our study or in the
relationships among these variables. Third, respondents are representative of our mailing sample in
terms of environmental performance.

A t-test indicated that respondents and a sample of non-

respondents did not significantly differ in terms of their change in toxic releases after certification
(based on three year average annual releases before and after ISO 14001 certification from the TRI
database).
Measures
The appendix lists definitions and data sources for our measures. For multi-items measures
we show Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients in the diagonal of the correlation matrix in Table 1.
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------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------------Independent variable. We measured quality of implementation of the ISO 14001 on a
continuum, ranging from low to high quality of implementation. We based our measure on items
used in previous studies (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Naveh & Marcus, 2005; Naveh & Marcus,
2004). Since implementation of ISO 14001 requires many different activities, our measure consists
of five survey items relating to different aspects of ISO 14001 implementation (e.g., use of ISO
14001 documents in daily practice, taking corrective actions, preparation for the audit). Please see
the Appendix for a complete list of the items included in this measure. While each of these items
captures a different activity associated with ISO 14001 implementation, all these activities are
interrelated as part of the EMS. Therefore, we expect that a facility’s quality of implementation will
be consistent for all these activities, e.g. facilities will not take corrective actions based on ISO 14001
audit findings if the EMS is not part of their regular routine. An exploratory factor analysis with
varimax rotation yielded one factor that all the five items loaded on, which indicates that quality of
implementation is a unidimensional construct.

The Cronbach Alpha of 0.81 exceeds the

recommended cutoff of 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), indicating internal consistency of the
items. Our measure is the average of the five survey items. A low score indicates low quality of
implementation and a high score indicates high quality of implementation.
Dependent variable. Environmental performance can be operationalized by different
measures, such as environmental reputation, compliance with environmental regulations, and
emissions. For this study we needed to select an environmental performance measure that is likely to
be directly affected by ISO 14001 implementation and for which data is available at the facility level.
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As a facility’s quality of ISO 14001 implementation is not transparent to outsiders it is not likely to
affect environmental reputation. Measures of compliance with environmental regulations such as
fines are episodic (Russo, 2001) and do not therefore reflect the continuous nature of the relationship
between EMS implementation and firms’ environmental performance. Compliance measures also
depend on enforcement that may be uneven across states and industries contributing to noise. To
overcome the limitations of these measures we operationalized environmental performance using
toxic emissions at the facility-level from the TRI database (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Klassen &
Whybark, 1999), which is commonly used in academic research. The TRI database is a publicly
available database compiled by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It contains
information on the quantity of toxic chemical releases for approximately 650 chemicals. Facilities in
the U.S. that employ ten or more full-time equivalent employees and that manufacture, process or
otherwise use at least one of these toxic chemicals in excess of the threshold quantity are required to
report their releases (EPA, 2006).
From the TRI database we obtained total chemical release information (both on-site and offsite emissions) for all reporting facilities for each year from 1995 to 2005. Because a few additional
chemicals were added to the TRI after 1995, we based our calculations for all years only on the 1995
list of core chemicals (i.e. all chemicals for which release data was included in the TRI database in
the year 1995), which makes release information comparable across years.
The dependent variable employed in our test of Hypothesis 1 is post-certification
environmental performance measured as the logarithm of reverse-scored average annual total TRI
releases for each certified facility in the three years after obtaining initial certification. Using threeyear average releases smoothes out the effects of one-time events such as accidental spills. The
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measure was reverse-scored because lower releases mean better environmental performance and
using logarithms of the TRI releases reduces the effects of extreme observations.
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 about the differences in improvement of environmental
performance between certified and non-certified facilities we measured the improvement in postcertification environmental performance relative to pre-certification environmental performance
calculated as the percentage reduction in three-year average annual total TRI releases after
certification.

Positive numbers indicate reductions in TRI emissions, i.e. improvements in

environmental performance, while negative numbers indicate increases in emission, i.e. decreases in
environmental performance.

For each of the non-certified matched facilities we based our

calculations on the same calendar years that we used to construct the measure for the corresponding
ISO 14001 certified facility. This allowed us to control for exogenous factors that affect the
environmental performance of all firms’ in an industry in a given year such as changes in
environmental regulations or technological advances. To reduce the effect of outliers, we
winsorized this variable (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008) at the 98th
percentile. However, our results do not change substantially when unwinsorized data is used.
Control variables. We included a variety of control variables that likely affect environmental
performance independent of the quality of ISO 14001 implementation in our tests of hypothesis 1.
Environmental performance in years prior to initial certification is likely to be a major determinant of
environmental performance after certification. We included the logarithm of reverse-scored average
annual total TRI releases for each facility in the three years prior to obtaining certification in our
model to control for this effect. Large facilities can employ scale-intensive abatement technologies
and may benefit from economies of scale in emission reduction. Therefore, we controlled for facility
size by using the logarithm of the number of employees as reported in our survey. A triangulation of
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this measure with employee data from the D&B Million Dollar Database showed a high and
significant correlation between the two variables (0.61, p < 0.01) increasing our confidence in the
survey-based measure. Older facilities likely use older equipment and technologies, which may
negatively affect environmental performance. Hence we controlled for facility age by using the
square root of the facility’s age in years as reported in our survey. Facilities in industries with a high
rate of technological change are more likely to change their equipment frequently. These facilities
are more likely to use the latest environmental technologies in production, which can be expected to
reduce emissions. We controlled for the rate of technological change in the industry by using a twoitem measure based on survey responses. Community pressures can affect facilities’ management of
their environmental activities (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006) which in turn can affect the environmental
performance of facilities. Following Kassinis and Vafeas (2006), we used community population
density measured as the logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square mile in the county in
which the facility was located in the year 2000 obtained from U.S. Census Bureau’s database to
control for community pressures.
Analytical Method and Preliminary Data Analysis
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1. We verified
that all variables included in this analysis conformed to the distributional assumptions of OLS
regression. For the variables that were not normally distributed (pre- and post-certification
environmental performance) we performed log-transformations to have their distributions
approximate normal distributions. Before performing the regression analysis, we evaluated the
likely extent of multicollinearity in our data. Low correlations among our independent variables (see
Table 1) and small variable inflations factors (VIF) – our largest VIF of 1.13 is well below the
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recommended cutoff of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980) – both suggest that multicollinearity is
not a problem in our data.
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 about the differences in environmental performance improvement
between certified and non-certified facilities, we used parametric, independent sample, one-tailed ttests. While a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that our environmental performance variable is not
normally distributed, our sample size is relatively large (greater than 25) and the sample sizes for our
groups of certified and non-certified facilities are equal which suggests that parametric tests are
appropriate (Gaither & Glorfeld, 1985). Levene’s test for equality of variance indicated that equal
variances for the two sub-samples of certified and non-certified facilities cannot be assumed.
Consequently, we report results of t-tests that do not assume equality of variances. Results of t-tests
that assumed equality of variances were consistent with the unequal variance results we report.
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we performed t-tests for the full sample (comparing all
certified facilities to all matched non-certified facilities). To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, we
divided our sample of 72 ISO certified facilities into two equal sized sub-samples of 36 highquality (top) and 36 low-quality (bottom) implementers based on their quality of ISO 14001
implementation scores. We assigned each non-certified facility to one of two corresponding
non-certified sub-samples depending on the assignment of its corresponding certified facility.
We performed separate t-tests for the sub-samples of top and bottom ISO 14001 implementers,
i.e. comparing the environmental performance improvement for the 36 facilities in each of our
two certified sub-samples to that of the 36 facilities in their corresponding sub-sample of
matched non-certified facilities. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample and
the top and bottom implementer sub-samples. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of our data.
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RESULTS
Table 2 shows the regression results for testing hypothesis 1. Model 1 includes control
variables only. In model 2, we added the independent variable quality of ISO 14001 implementation.
------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------Hypothesis 1 suggests that higher quality ISO 14001 implementation leads to better postcertification environmental performance. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The coefficient
for quality of implementation in model 2 is positive and significant (p < 0.001) and including
quality of implementation significantly improves the explanatory power of the model (p < 0.001).
Table 4 shows the t-test results for the differences in post-certification environmental
performance improvement between ISO 14001 certified and matched non-certified facilities for our
tests of hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2a suggests that ISO 14001 certified firms have higher
environmental performance improvements after certification than non-certified firms while
hypothesis 2b suggests that such differences do not exist. We find that for the full sample both
certified facilities and their non-certified counterparts show decreases in environmental performance
after certification (Table 3). While the decrease in environmental performance is smaller for the
certified facilities than for the non-certified facilities (i.e. the certified facilities have better
environmental performance), our t-test indicates that this difference is not significant (Table 4). This
result lends support to hypothesis 2b.
------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
--------------------------------------
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------------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
-------------------------------------Hypothesis 3a suggests that after certification ISO 14001 certified firms that pursue high
quality implementation have higher environmental performance improvements than non-certified
firms. This hypothesis is supported. Results indicate that for the top implementer sub-sample, the
difference in environmental performance improvement between certified facilities and non-certified
facilities is significant (p < 0.05). An examination of the means for the sub-sample (Table 3)
indicates that top implementers experience environmental performance improvements whereas their
non-certified counterparts see environmental performance decreases.
Hypothesis 3b suggests that after certification ISO 14001 certified firms that pursue low
quality implementation will not differ in environmental performance improvements from noncertified firms.

This hypothesis is supported.

For the bottom implementer sub-sample, the

difference in environmental performance improvement between certified facilities and non-certified
facilities is not significant.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study we examined how the variance in the implementation of certifiable
environmental standards among certified firms affects the two functions that certifiable standards
need to fulfill to be effective mechanisms for governing firms’ environmental conduct in the global
economy – improvement of firms’ environmental performance and signaling firms’ environmental
responsibility to customers and other external stakeholders. Using the ISO 14001 environmental
management system standard as the research setting, our results show that quality of standard
implementation in certified facilities affects the realization of the environmental performance benefits
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intended by the standard. The higher a certified facility’s quality of implementation of the ISO
14001 EMS, the lower are its toxic emissions after certification. Our results also show that the interfirm variance in standard implementation affects the accuracy of standards as a signal of firms’
environmental responsibility. Comparing post-certification changes in emissions of ISO 14001
certified facilities with changes in emissions for a matched sample of non-ISO 14001 certified
facilities for the same calendar years, we find that these two groups do not differ significantly in their
environmental performance. When analyzing the differences between certified and non-certified
facilities for sub-samples of top and bottom quality implementers we find that certified top (high
quality) implementers have superior environmental performance compared to their non-certified
counterparts, while we find no significant difference in the environmental performance between
certified bottom (low quality) implementers and their non-certified counterparts.
Implications for the use of certifiable standards as governance mechanism
These results raise troubling concerns for the effectiveness of governance systems for firms’
conduct based on certifiable standards. Firms’ variance in the implementation of ISO 14001, the
most widely adopted voluntary environmental standard, compromises the performance benefits
intended by the standard to such an extent that firms’ standard certification does not allow customers
and other stakeholders to correctly identify environmentally responsible firms. Overall, certified
firms do not show significantly higher environmental performance than non-certified firms. Whether
ISO certification is an accurate signal for firms’ environmental responsibility hinges on firms’ quality
of implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS. Firms’ quality of implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS
is not observable by outsiders (King et al., 2005), so that customers and other stakeholders have no
way of telling which certified firms are high quality and which are low quality implementers. Thus,
customers and other stakeholders can only use ISO 14001 certification as an indication that a firm
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may have superior environmental performance, but they will not be able to tell for which certified
firms this is actually the case.
Thus our findings pose a serious threat to the credibility of the ISO 14001 certification
system. Without proper implementation the system reduces to a meaningless label that is intended to
enhance firm legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders. Once those stakeholders become aware
that the inter-firm variance in implementation quality threatens the accuracy of ISO certification as a
signal of superior environmental conduct, the credibility and legitimacy of the system of ISO 14001
certification may be jeopardized. When stakeholders realize that certification does not allow them to
differentiate between high and low environmental performers they will cease rewarding firms that
are certified (Terlaak, 2007), thus reducing incentives for firms to obtain certification. For example,
the loss of standard credibility may result in customers ceasing to make ISO 14001 a criterion in their
supplier selection. As a result suppliers may cease to see any reasons for obtaining ISO 14001
certification, which would result in lower numbers of certified firms.
Increasing the effectiveness of certifiable standards as governance mechanisms
We do not mean to suggest that it is impossible for ISO 14001 to be an effective governance
mechanism for firm self-regulation. Indeed, we find that firms with high quality of ISO 14001
implementation had superior environmental performance than non-certified firms. Thus ISO 14001
can be an effective tool for self-regulation if firms implement it properly. This suggests that
governance systems for firm self-regulation based on certifiable standards need to put more effective
enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with standard requirements in certified firms
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006). The effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms can be increased by
making changes in the audit system itself and by making auditors more accountable for their work.
Changes in the audit system could include unannounced surprise audits to verify that certified firms
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are using the practices prescribed by the standard in their daily operations and are not receiving and
maintaining certification by making last-minute audit preparations. In addition, putting time limits
on the relationships between auditors and their clients would alleviate some of the concerns about
conflicts of interests that currently exist in the auditor-client relationship in which auditors may not
want to be too stringent out of fear of losing clients. The accountability of auditors for their work
could be increased by surprise spot-checks of a few certified firms by other auditors. These surprise
spot-checks could be initiated by the national accreditation agencies that accredit auditors to certify
the standard.
The findings of our study point to one important change in the ISO 14001 audit system that
could enhance its effectiveness, an increase in the transparency of audit findings to the public. While
the auditor provides the client a complete record of the audit, there is no public record of audit results
and certification failures (Stenzel, 2000). Increasing the transparency of audit findings to the public
could increase the accuracy of standard certification as a signal of responsible environmental conduct
by allowing customers and other stakeholders to obtain more information about certified firms’
quality of ISO 14001 implementation. For example, a rating system that provides more information
about the quality of implementation in certified firms could be instituted. Similar to the Leadership
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System that provides standards
for environmentally sustainable construction, ISO could institute a point system in which firms’ level
of certification (e.g. Platinum, Gold, Silver, etc.) depends on the number of points obtained during an
audit.

The number of points could be tied to the certified firm’s quality of ISO 14001

implementation. Information about audit failures may also provide important clues about a certified
firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation to external stakeholders. It is estimated that in the
United States 30 to 35 percent of facilities fail at their first audit to the ISO 9001 quality management
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system standard (Nichols, 1993), which is similar in the design and the nature of requirements to the
ISO 14001 standards, but that most firms seeking certification eventually attain it. Firms that
repeatedly fail their certification audits likely have a lower quality of implementation of their ISO
14001 EMS.
The finding that the ISO 14001 standard is not effective in maintaining a consistent quality of
implementation suggests that the standard has not so far been capable of establishing a normative
base for firms’ environmental conduct. This finding seems to corroborate an early realization that
normative behavior cannot be produced through self-interests and market incentives but through
intrinsic environmental values (Hoffman, 1991). While such intrinsic ecological values foster a more
holistic approach to ecological responsiveness only very few firms possess such values (Bansal &
Roth, 2000). Scholars have expressed hope that firms may internalize certifiable management
practices such that compliance is driven by intrinsic values rather than by external sanctions and the
potential for internal benefits (Terlaak, 2007). However, given that such intrinsic ecological values
are currently relatively rare, standard monitoring and enforcement may become even more important
to assure that certified firms comply with standard requirements.
Implications for research
Our findings also have important implications for research on certifiable standards by
highlighting the importance of considering firms’ quality of implementation of certifiable
management standards after their certification by independent auditors. Most prior studies have used
standard certification as a proxy for the implementation of the practices certified by the standard
without considering implementation quality (e.g., Darnall & Sides, 2008; Potoski & Prakash, 2005a;
Russo, 2001). Our findings suggest that inter-firm variance in standard implementation quality can
explain conflicting findings in prior empirical research. The mixed empirical evidence on the
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relationship between standard certification and environmental performance may be due to the failure
to take into account firms’ implementation quality.
Further research could explore the antecedents of firms’ quality of implementation of
certifiable standards.

Our findings indicate that some certified firms behave as predicted by

institutional theory by mainly focusing on certification to the standard without changing their internal
processes to the extent required to achieve the intended environmental performance benefits of
standard implementation. Other firms behave as predicted by the view that standards provide
rational and systematic management practices that result in performance improvement in certified
firms. We do not know which factors prompt firms to behave in these different ways. Factors that
may affect firms’ quality of implementation include external factors such as the extent of institutional
pressures for certification that they face as well as internal factors such as their motivation for
certification or the resources and capabilities that firms possess to implement the standard.
While our study is the first to show a relationship between quality of standard
implementation and environmental performance, we are not the first to suggest that ISO auditing
may not ensure compliance with ISO standards. It may be a fruitful area for further research to
investigate why ISO has not yet made efforts to improve its system of external audits. Future
research could explore whether ISO is really committed to improving environmental performance as
stated in their documents or whether an alternative institutional explanation for their behavior exists.
Limitations and conclusion
Our study is not without limitations. First, we test our hypotheses in the context of a single
management standard, the ISO 14001 EMS standard. However, we believe that the general lessons
of our study apply to other standards as well, especially when these standards become a requirement
for firms to do business, so that firms adopt these standards not because of intrinsic motivations, but
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because of coercive pressures. Furthermore, many international standards for firms’ social and
environmental conduct such as the United Nations’ Global Compact or the International Chamber of
Commerce’s Business Charter for Sustainable Development are not externally audited. For these
standards the issue of symbolic adoption may be even more widespread as they lack an enforcement
system to assure firm compliance. Second, implementation should ideally be studied over a period
of time (Klein & Sorra, 1996). It would be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the
quality of implementation changes over time at a given facility. Unfortunately, longitudinal data that
might allow us to examine these issues is difficult and time consuming to obtain for a large sample of
firms, but this may be a worthwhile endeavor for future research. Third, our study uses data from a
single country – the United States.

However, we do not see any reason to believe that the

relationship between the quality of ISO implementation and environmental performance we
uncovered in our study is unique to the U.S. What may however differ in other countries is the
quality of ISO audits. In particular, concerns have been voiced about the variance in audit stringency
among auditors in emerging economies such as China (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Yeung & Mok,
2005). Thus, in other countries variations in firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation may be
even larger, which is likely to exacerbate threats to the effectiveness of using certifiable standards as
a governance mechanism for firms’ conduct uncovered in our study.
Despite these limitations our study makes an important contribution to the literature on
certifiable standards by highlighting the importance of a variable that has previously not received
sufficient attention – the quality of standard implementation. We empirically show that facilities’
low quality of standard implementation compromises both functions that certifiable standards need to
fulfill to serve as effective governance mechanisms for firm self-regulation in the global economy –
improvement of environmental performance and signaling superior environmental responsibility.
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations for ISO 14001 Certified Facilitiesa

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Mean

SD

1

3.95

1.36

-

5.47

.86

-.14

0.81

3.99

1.39

.94**

.03

-

2.53

.45

.13

-.05

.16

-

Facility age
6.02
Technological change in industry -.16

1.82

.06

-.03

.04

.16

-

.93

-.04

.01

.03

.23

-.12

0.71

-.20

*

-.09

-.07

.01

-.06

Post-certification environmental
performanceb
Quality of implementation
Pre-certification environmental
b
performance
b
Facility Size
c

County population density

b

2.33

.58

2

.25

3

4

5

a

n = 72
Log-transformed variables
c
Square root transformation
Cronbach Alphas are reported along the diagonal.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
b
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6

7

-

TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysisa
Dependent Variable: PostCertification Environmental
Performance
Model 1

Model 2

Independent Variable
.23***
(.06)

Quality of implementation
Control Variables
.90***
(.04)

.91***
(.04)

Facility size b

.03
(.13)

.05
(.12)

Facility age c

-.01
(.03)

-.01
(.03)

Technological change in industry

.11†
(.06)

.10†
(.06)

County population density b

.28**
(.09)

.19**
(.09)

107.75***

110.42***

Pre-certification environmental
performance b

F-Test
R2

.89

.91

Adjusted R2

.88

.90
.02

R2 Change

14.03***

F for R2 Change
a

Values are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Log-transformed variables
c
Square root transformation
b

†

p < .10
n = 72

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001 (all two-tailed tests)
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample and Top and Bottom ISO 14001 Implementersa

Sample
size

Quality of
Implementation

Environmental
Performance
Improvement b

Full Sample

72

5.47
(0.10)

-0.23
(0.20)

Top Implementers

36

6.17
(0.07)

0.11
(0.13)

Bottom Implementers

36

4.77
(0.09)

-0.57
(0.37)

Full Sample

72

-

-0.59
(0.28)

Facilities matched with
certified Top Implementers

36

-

-0.79
(0.38)

Facilities matched with
certified Bottom
Implementers

36

-

-0.37
(0.29)

Certified Facilities

Non-certified Facilities

a
b

Mean values are given. Standard errors are in parentheses
Positive values indicate improvements in environmental performance
Negative values indicate environmental performance degradations
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FIGURE 1
Environmental Performance Improvements of Certified Facilities and their Matched NonCertified Facilities by Quality of Implementation

Low

High
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TABLE 4
Independent Sample t-Tests of Mean Differences in Environmental Performance
Improvements between Certified and Non-Certified Facilities

Sample Size

Mean
Difference

Standard
Error
Difference

Significance
Levela
(t-value)

Full Sample

72

0.36

0.35

0.16
(1.02)

Sub-sample 1:
Top ISO 14001 Implementers

36

0.91

0.51

0.04
(1.79)

Sub-sample 2:
Bottom ISO 14001 Implementers

36

-0.20

0.47

0.33
(0.43)

a

one-tailed tests
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APPENDIX: Measures
Construct

Indicator

Post-certification
environmental
performance

Logarithm of average total annual chemical releases for facility for the three-year
period directly following the year of initial ISO certification (reverse-scored).
Data Source: TRI Database

Environmental
performance
improvement

Post-certification reduction in TRI emissions in percent calculated as: (3-year
average total annual TRI chemical releases before certification)-( 3-year
average total annual TRI chemical releases after certification)/( 3-year
average total annual TRI chemical releases before certification)
For calculating this variable for each non-certified facility in the matched sample
the same calendar years were used as for the corresponding certified facility.
Data Source: TRI Database

Quality of
implementation

Survey Items: (rated on 7-point Likert scale)
This question pertains to the implementation and perceptions of the ISO
14001 EMS at your facility. To what extent:
1) are the documents created for the purpose of ISO 14001 used in daily practice?
2) has the ISO 14001 system become part of your regular routine?
3) are preparations for external audits made at the last minute? (reverse-scored)
4) is the system regularly ignored? (reverse-scored)
5) does facility management implement corrective actions based on ISO 14001
audit findings?

Pre-certification
environmental
performance

Logarithm of average total annual chemical releases for facility over a period of
three years directly preceding the year of initial ISO certification (reverse scored).
Data Source: TRI database

Technological
change in industry

Survey Items: (rated on 7-point Likert scale)
How would you rate your main product in terms of percent of sales along the
following characteristics?
1) Slow changing technology…Fast changing technology
2) Mature process technology…Evolving process technology

Facility size

Logarithm of the number of employees in the facility.
Survey question:
Approximately, how many employees does your facility have?
(Triangulated with data from Dunn and Bradstreet database)

County population
density

Logarithm of the number of county inhabitants per mile (2000) county in
which facility is located.
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Database
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